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PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Scott Gutierrez *

ABSTRACT
Public transportation systems carry millions of daily commuters and provide a
valuable platform for display advertising. However, transit authorities that open
their rolling billboards to speech may be hesitant to carry ads that offend riders
and create conflicts with their mission of providing a safe and comfortable
commuting experience. Advocacy groups have sued to overturn bans on
controversial transit ads, prompting inconsistent rulings about whether such bans
violate the first amendment. These rulings rely on Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, a divided supreme court decision from 1974 that held that the first
amendment did not require the Shaker Heights transit system to run political ads
inside buses. This article proposes that it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit
Lehman, and time for public transit agencies to choose between advertising
revenue and unfettered speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Battles over bus ads have erupted all over the country.1 The fight is between
public transit agencies and advocacy groups over controversial advertising that
some organizations seek to display on buses and transit stations.2 Transit officials
generally refuse to accept ads related to topics such as religion or abortion, citing
concerns that commuters might take offense and boycott their services.3 Various
political and religious advocacy groups have sued over these policies, arguing free
speech is threatened if ads are allowed only when public transit authorities agree
with the message.4 A transit system thus may find itself having to choose between
“complaints about the advertisements it accepts” and “lawsuits over the
advertisements it rejects.”5
The First Amendment famously prohibits the government from “abridging the
freedom of speech.”6 But courts have long allowed more leeway when speech
occurs on government property or interferes with government services.7 In Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, nearly 50 years ago, a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court declared that public transit systems are free to make “reasonable
choices” concerning advertising on their vehicles to avoid disruptions and create a
comfortable environment for commuters.8 But Lehman’s authority hangs on the
narrowest of concurrences from Justice William Douglas.9 As a result, courts have
inconsistently applied Lehman,10 resulting in weaker protection for bus ads in
Boston or Seattle than in New York or Chicago.11
This article explores whether the Court should revisit Lehman as transit officials
struggle to balance their pursuit of advertising revenue, which helps offset the costs
of service, with First Amendment rights. It explains how three significant First
Amendment doctrines have evolved since Lehman, which create conflicts that fuel
some of the recent litigation. It also proposes how the Supreme Court could address
those conflicts.
1
Martine Powers, In an era when everything is political, is any Metro ad noncontroversial?,
WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/in-anera-when-everything-is-political-is-any-metro-ad-noncontroversial/2018/08/18/a0e691e8-a0c811e8-8e87-c869fe70a721_story.html; see also Engy Abdelkader, ‘Savagery’ in the Subways: AntiMuslim Ads, the First Amendment, and the Efficacy of Counterspeech, 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 43, 58
(2014).
2
Id.
3
Id.; see also Child. of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 1998).
4
Powers, supra note 1; see also Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU sues
DC Metro over Rejection of First Amendment Ad (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/aclu-sues-dc-metro-over-rejection-first-amendment-ad.
5
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 901 F.3d 356, 373 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
6
U.S. Const. amend. I.
7
WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10383, RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND
ADVERTISING: CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2019).
8
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974).
9
Id. at 305, (Douglas, J., concurring).
10
Id.
11
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1023 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Part I focuses on transit advertising practices and how buses fit within public
forum doctrine, which classifies the government’s authority to regulate private
speech depending on the type of forum where it occurs. Part I also explains why
some federal courts differ in how they interpret Lehman to determine what type of
forum exists on the side of a bus.
Part II provides an overview of commercial speech doctrine and how courts
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial ads, and why that distinction
can complicate a transit system’s ability under Lehman to regulate advertising that
blends commercial speech with political or religious messages.
Part III explains the First Amendment’s vigilance for viewpoint discrimination
and how the Supreme Court broadly defines a protected viewpoint. Part III also will
explain how the Court’s definition of viewpoint discrimination has evolved since
Lehman, and why this presents a conflict for transit systems that prohibit religious
speech or ads containing offensive material.
Part IV examines Lehman’s holding that transit riders are a captive audience
with a right to be free from offensive advertising. It analyzes whether that right can
provide a basis for transit authorities to ban controversial ads on bus exteriors when
riders are seated inside.
Part V argues that the Supreme Court must revisit Lehman to provide clearer
guidance on First Amendment protection for bus ads. Furthermore, it proposes new
criteria for assessing the level of protection for speech in government forums with
high communicative value.
Part VI recommends alternatives to all-out censorship for transit authorities,
including the use of counterspeech, or internally created ads, to challenge messages
conveyed by offensive ads. Finally, it explores the possibility that Congress may
intervene, as transit systems rely heavily on federal funding.
Part VII will conclude with a summary as to why Lehman is outdated in light
of more recent Supreme Court decisions and how public transit authorities can use
strategies such as counterspeech to emphasize their core values.
I.

ADVERTISING ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

A. Offensive Bus Ads on the Rise
Millions ride public transportation every day, providing advertisers with a lowcost means of marketing,12 and “a singular opportunity to sway public opinion.”13
After the Great Recession, more transit authorities sought to increase ad revenue to

12

See Ken Klein, As Transit Ridership Dips, Advertising Revenue Grows, OUT OF HOME
ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA: SPECIAL REPORTS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://special
reports.oaaa.org/transitdipsadsgrow (stating that transit ad revenue increased to nearly $500
million in 2018, compared to roughly $15 billion collected in fare revenue).
13
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 592 (1st Cir.
2015) (Stahl, J., concurring in part); see also Antelope Valley Transit Experiments with Digital
Bus Ads, METRO MAGAZINE (May 26, 2015), https://www.metro-magazine.com/10036920
/antelope-valley-transit-experiments-with-digital-bus-ads (stating that some transit agencies are
experimenting with digital ads that can be programmed to display various content).
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help recover financially.14 Advertising standards vary by city and agency.15
Commercial ads that promote services or products commonly are permitted, while
forbidden content typically includes depictions of violence or weapons, obscenity
or adult-oriented material, or ads that are libelous, false, or misleading.16 In some
cities, ads related to alcohol or tobacco are also not allowed.17
Some transit agencies have adopted policies comparable to dinner table rules:
no politics, no religion, and no controversy or disparaging words.18 This article
primarily focuses on policies related to these categories involving “noncommercial”19 or “public issue”20 ads, which contain political, religious, or issueadvocacy speech.
Transit advertising policies were tested during the last decade when the
American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI) launched a campaign of “anti-jihad
bus and billboard” ads in several major cities.21 Led by Pamela Geller, who has
been described as “one of the most flamboyant anti-Muslim activists in the United
States,”22 AFDI “express[ed] its message on current events and public issues,”
including global terrorism.23 AFDI’s ads were instantly controversial and often
placed on transit systems where other organizations had sponsored ads supportive
of Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.24
Transit agencies, some under intense community pressure, tried to block
Geller’s ads out of concern they would incite hate crimes or worse. 25 Geller sued,
14
Brittni Rubin, Revised Ad Policies Helping Transit Agencies, METRO MAGAZINE (Nov. 14,
2012), https://www.metro-magazine.com/bus/article/211681/revised-ad-policies-helping-transitagencies.
15
See Lew R.C. Bricker, Ryan B. Jacobsen & Colin P. Gainer, Transit Cooperative Research
Program, Developing and Implementing a Transit Advertising Policy, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST
33, 11-12 (August 2010), https://books.nap.edu/read/22932/chapter/1.
16
Id. at 13-15 (stating that some agencies manage advertising internally while others contract
with private firms to sell ad space and screen ads under the agency’s policies, with final decisions
made by transit officials); see Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2004).
17
Luis Ferre-Sadurni, M.T.A. Will Ban Alcohol Advertising on Buses and Subways, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/nyregion/alcohol-advertising-mtasubway.html.
18
See MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSP. AUTH., GUIDELINES REGULATING MBTA
ADVERTISING (amended Nov. 20, 2017), https://cdn.mbta.com/sites/default/files/businesscenter/2017-11-20-mbta-advertising-guidelines.pdf (stating that transit guidelines prohibit
“[d]emeaning or disparaging ads,” “[p]olitical campaign speech,” and “[p]olitical Issues or
Matters of Public Debate” such as “economic, political, moral, religious, or social issues”).
19
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 300.
20
See Amalgamated Transit Union Loc. 1015 v. Spokane Transit Auth., 929 F.3d 643, 648 (9th
Cir. 2019).
21
Engy Abdelkader, ‘Savagery’ in the Subways: Anti-Muslim Ads, the First Amendment, and
the Efficacy of Counterspeech, 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 43, 58 (2014).
22
Pamela Geller, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER: EXTREMIST FILES
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/pamela-geller.
23
Petitioner-Appellant’s Br. at 7, Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 796 F.3d 1165
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-35897).
24
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 574 (1st Cir.
2015); see also Abdelkader, supra note 21, at 66 (stating that the AFDI ads equated Muslims with
“savages” or portrayed them as terrorists).
25
See Abdelkader, supra note 21, at 67.
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and in several cases, including in New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.,
courts ruled that transit authorities had violated free speech rights protected by the
First Amendment.26 In response, many transit systems closed their programs
altogether or enacted more restrictive policies that affected other
advertisers.27 More lawsuits followed from the American Civil Liberties Union,
news media, religious groups and others, evincing a fundamental and sometimes
painful truth about the First Amendment: “it protect[s] the freedom to express ‘the
thought that we hate.’”28
B. Lehman Divides the Court
Transit officials turned to the Lehman decision to support their regulations on
speech. In 1970, Harry Lehman sued the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit System for
refusing to run his election ads inside the city’s buses, which carried many of his
potential constituents.29 The Cleveland suburb had long forbidden political ads as
a courtesy to customers and accepted only commercial advertising.30 Lehman,
running for state office, argued the advertising car cards were a “public forum
protected by the First Amendment,” which guaranteed access to publicly owned
and controlled areas of communication opened to other advertisers.31
A plurality of the Supreme Court disagreed, holding “[n]o First Amendment
forum is here to be found,” as the transit system’s advertising space was
consciously limited “in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of
favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.”32
Writing for the plurality, Justice Harry Blackmun reasoned that bus systems
were not like street corners and meeting halls that are traditional places for the
exchange of ideas, and had to be treated more like government-run businesses.33
Thus, the city was free to impose restrictions that were not “arbitrary, capricious,
or invidious” and reasonably served its mission to provide convenient and pleasant
travel.34 Blackmun found the city’s preference for “innocuous and less
controversial [commercial] and service[-]oriented advertising” to be
reasonable.35 Furthermore, he noted the policy had been in place consistently for
26

See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), No. 14-5335, 2014 WL
6676517, at 1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2014); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 898 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C 2012).
27
Answering Brief of King County at 1, Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 904
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that this became known as the “Geller Ban,” which was
estimated to affect advertising for 50 million transit passengers).
28
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 705 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
29
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 299 (stating that Lehman wanted to run ads
describing him as “Old-fashioned! About Honesty, Integrity and Good Government”).
30
Id. at 300.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 304.
33
Id. at 303.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 304.
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26 years.36 He reasoned that if the Court were to rule otherwise, “other public
facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be
pamphleteer and politician.”37
Lehman’s precedential authority rests on the opinion by Justice Douglas
concurring only in the Court’s judgment. He concurred only to protect the rights of
transit riders, whom he considered a captive audience because they rely on a bus or
streetcar “to get to work or back home.”38 He argued Lehman had “no right to force
his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.”39 He noted, “if
we are to turn a bus or streetcar into either a newspaper or a park, we take great
liberties with people who . . . at the same time are captive viewers or listeners”40
and have “no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen.’”41
But Douglas noted he did not oppose political ads per se, as “[c]ommercial
advertisements may be as offensive and intrusive to captive audiences as any
political message.”42
Justice William Brennan, who authored the dissent, castigated the other
justices for condoning censorship of political speech.43 Brennan argued the city had
no right to “select which issues are worth discussing or debating” once it opened
its property to speech,44 and that excluding political advertising amounted to
“invidious discrimination on the basis of subject matter” prohibited by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.45
Brennan also rejected the argument that political ads were any more likely than
commercial or public service advertisements to interfere with the mission of public
transportation.46 He noted that “[i]n the eyes of many passengers, certain
commercial or public service messages are as profoundly disturbing as some
political advertisements.47
Decades later, Brennan’s dissent and a related footnote would trigger
disagreement over the scope of Lehman. Brennan noted that Harry Lehman had
been denied access to both the interior and exterior of transit vehicles.48 Brennan
rejected the idea that riders truly were powerless to ignore bus ads, further noting,
“[w]hatever applicability a ‘captive audience’ theory may have to interior
advertising, it simply cannot justify the city's refusal to rent Lehman exterior
advertising space.”49 Interestingly, the plurality never directly addresses exterior
36

Id. at 300.
Id. at 304.
38
Id. at 306.
39
Id. at 307.
40
Id. at 306-7.
41
Id. at 307.
42
Id. at 308.
43
See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 316 (emphasizing that the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establish “an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas’” and provide “all points
of view an equal opportunity to be heard”).
45
Id. at 319-20.
46
Id. at 314.
47
Id. at 319.
48
Id. at 320 n.12.
49
Id.
37
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advertising.50 Still, some federal courts treat the Lehman decision as though it does.
C. Public Forums and the Government’s Rights
Nothing in the Constitution requires the government to freely open buses or
other property anytime someone wants to exercise their right to free speech.51 In
other words, free speech is not a free pass to every protestor. 52 Like a private
property owner, the government has a right to preserve its property “for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.”53 For instance, a military base can remain off-limits
to leafletting because such activity would potentially interfere with training soldiers
and strengthening the nation’s defenses.54
Public forum doctrine arose as a framework for balancing the government’s
property interests with the interests of those who wish to use the property for
expression.55 Under the doctrine, public forums are classified as one of three
varieties: traditional, designated, or limited.56 The type of forum determines the
government’s authority to regulate speech on its property.57
Traditional public forums include parks, streets, and public squares, which “by
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”58
These represent “quintessential” forums that “have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and . . . communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”59 Traditional public forums thus warrant the First
Amendment’s strongest protection, meaning any restrictions can only survive if
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.60 That is a high bar that is
rarely cleared.
Designated public forums refer to government properties “designated” as
forums for expressive use, such as a public auditorium.61 Designated forums can
be closed when the government chooses, but speech must be allowed while the
forum is open unless restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest.62 The government may impose “time, place, and manner” restrictions to
manage the forum,63 but only if necessary to further a substantial interest and as
50

See id. at 303 (concluding a city transit system has discretion to make reasonable choices
concerning the advertising that may be displayed “in” its vehicles).
51
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985).
52
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
53
Id. at 800.
54
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
55
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
56
Id.; see also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (clarifying that
nonpublic forums now referred to as “limited public forum[s]”).
57
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. at 800.
58
See Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
59
Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
60
Id.
61
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998).
62
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45.
63
Id.; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding parade licensing
law, which served the municipality's legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing public
order, and ensuring that parades are not scheduled simultaneously).
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long as speakers have alternate channels for expression.64
“Limited public forums” are property opened for expression but with
limitations on preserve the property’s main purpose.65 Here, the government has
more leeway to decide which speakers, groups, and subjects are allowed.66 Even
with more flexibility, the government may only censor speech when it “would
actually’ interfere with the forum’s stated purposes.”67 Any restrictions must be
reasonable in light of those purposes and not be a pretext for the government to
silence speech with which it disagrees.68
Reasonableness does not require the “most reasonable” or “only reasonable”
options.69 The content of the ad or the advertiser’s identity need not have a “strict
incompatibility” with the forum’s purpose to be prohibited.70 A ban on certain types
of bus ads, for example, might be reasonable if such ads were likely to discourage
people from riding the bus.71
Non-traditional forums are not open to speech unless the government
intentionally permits it.72 When a dispute arises, courts may infer intent from
“looking to the policy and practice[s]” of the forum, as well as “the nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity.”73 Intent can also be
established where the government makes the property “generally available” to a
class of speakers or grants permission “as a matter of course.”74 Where the
government runs a business that would be disrupted by expressive activity, courts
are “particularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a
public forum.”75
The scope of the forum is defined by where the speaker seeks access.76 If a
teachers’ union seeks exclusive use of school mailboxes, for example, the mail
system is considered the forum and not the school.77 Finally, when the government
designates a public forum, it retains the authority to convert the property back to a
limited public forum at any time as long as it is not used as a pretext to censor a
particular viewpoint.78
64

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. at 800.
66
Id. at 808.
67
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp. (SMART),
698 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 2012).
68
Id. at 499.
69
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808.
70
Id.
71
See Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 438 (3d
Cir. 2019); see also KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSIT ADVERTISING
POLICY (Dec. 27, 2018), https://kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/transportation
/metro/about/advertising/transit-advertising-policy.pdf (stating that the “primary purpose of the
transit system . . . is to provide safe and reliable transportation” and “retain existing riders and
attract new users of public transit services”).
72
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. at 802.
73
Id.
74
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 47.
75
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
76
Id. at 801.
77
Perry, 460 U.S. at 41.
78
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. at 803.
65
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D. Buses: Designated or Limited Public Forums?
Public transit systems and transportation hubs have proven difficult to
generalize within the public forum framework.79 The Supreme Court decided
Lehman before public forum doctrine was clearly established, thus circuit courts
have taken different approaches to interpreting what Lehman means in terms of
assessing a transit authority’s intent.80 A majority of courts conclude that when a
transit system “accept[s] a wide array of political and issue-related ads,” (unlike the
transit system in Lehman) that means transit officials intended to open the forum to
debate and exercise less control over content.81 The First and the Ninth Circuits,
however, are more deferential to what transit advertising policies actually say.82
Under the latter approach, a transit agency that occasionally accepts ads related to
political issues but maintains a formal policy banning political ads would not
necessarily be considered a designated forum.83
In the late 1990s, New York Magazine drew the ire of then-Mayor Giuliani by
sponsoring a bus ad displaying the magazine’s logo and this message: “Possibly the
only good thing in New York Rudy hasn’t taken credit for.”84 The Mayor’s Office
demanded the Metropolitan Transit Authority remove the ad because it had
appropriated the mayor’s name to promote a product.85 The magazine sued, and the
Second Circuit concluded New York’s transit system was a designated public
forum, and therefore could not censor the ad because “[a]llowing political
speech . . . evidences a general intent to open a space for discourse, and a deliberate
acceptance of the possibility of clashes of opinion and controversy that the Court
in Lehman recognized as inconsistent with sound commercial practice.”86
The Ninth Circuit, however, criticized decisions by its sister courts for
See Int’l Soc’y. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681, (1992) (holding
an airport terminal is not a public forum because modern air travel hasn’t existed long enough be
considered a traditional forum); see also Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d
893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding acceptance of political ads in subway station constituted a
public forum). But cf. Metro Display Advert., Inc. v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th
Cir. 1998) (avoiding question of forum definition but reasoning bus shelters could be either
limited or designated public fora as they are maintained like private property but installed along
the streets, which are traditional forums).
80
See Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 439
(noting Lehman had to be “retconned” into modern public forum analysis).
81
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. at 1024 (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United
Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 346 (6th
Cir. 1998) (finding bus agency’s explicit policy that “buses, bus shelters, and billboards are not
public forums” was undercut by acceptance of political and public speech ads). But cf. Am.
Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp. (SMART), 698 F.3d 885
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding a transit system in Detroit was a limited public forum because it had
“completely banned political advertising, showing its intent to act as a commercial proprietor);
abrogated by Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp., 978 F.3d
481 (6th Cir. 2020).
85
New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 126.
86
Id. at 130.
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“mistakenly [concluding] that if the government opens a forum and is willing to
accept political speech, it has necessarily signaled an intent to create a designated
public forum.”87 The Ninth Circuit held King County Metro Transit in Seattle had
established a limited public forum because it “pre-screened all proposed ads and
consistently rejected ads that were non-compliant.”88 In addition, the court
explained that it considered “the county’s enforcement of the policy as a whole, not
just the specific provision invoked to exclude the ads at issue.”89
Courts that defer to a transit agency’s written policy argue that it “encourage[s]
the government to open its property to some expressive activity in cases where, if
faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not open the property at all.”90 Since
the government ultimately has the power to close the forum, “[m]unicipalities faced
with the prospect of having to accept virtually all political speech if they accept
any . . . will simply close the forum to political speech altogether” which results in
“less speech, not more – exactly what the Court’s public forum precedents seek to
avoid.”91 Transit authorities argue this approach better serves their proprietary
interests by avoiding any ads that might offend riders and lead to a reduction in fare
or ad revenue.
Some courts, however, question whether forum analysis is weakened by
allowing “the government’s own self-serving statements about its intended use for
a public place to outweigh the forum’s inherent attributes.”92 Circuit Judge Norman
Stahl, partially concurring in a First Circuit case, wrote it “leaves the government
with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing
more than articulating a nonspeech-related purpose for the area.”93 And it
contradicts the “unique suitability” of a transit system “for open discourse between
citizens,” which is “indicative of a public, rather than private forum.”94
Members of the Supreme Court, including Justices Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito, have raised alarm that transit authorities in some major cities “are
bound by rulings that classify their ad spaces as designated public forums” while
others that are similarly open to political speech “can freely restrict speech based
on its content.”95 But the Court has thus far let the issue percolate, narrowly
rejecting certiorari in recent cases.96
87

Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County, 781 F.3d. 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2015);
see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 579 (1st Cir.
2015) (holding Boston’s transit system “was indistinguishable from the program at issue in
Lehman” even if willing to accept a wider range of advertisements, including “many controversial
ones”).
88
Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d. at 498.
89
Id.
90
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680.
91
Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d. at 500.
92
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 592 (1st Cir. 2015)
(Stahl, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at, 592–93 (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
94
Id.
95
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. at 1023 (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
96
Id.
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COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL SPEECH

Transit agencies have inherent control over whether to operate a designated or
limited public forum, and some have switched to a limited public forum by banning
previously-allowed political ads and accepting only commercial ads to “indicate[]
that making money is the goal.”97 This is another reason why Lehman is
remarkable: it allowed transit authorities to “reverse the traditional priorities of the
First Amendment” by granting stronger protection to commercial speech than
political speech.98
Part II provides an overview of commercial speech doctrine and why
commercial-only ad policies present a challenge when commercial speech blends
with political and religious elements. Part II also explains how the commercial
speech doctrine evolved in a relatively short period of time to a point where efforts
to regulate it are disfavored.
A. Commercial Speech and the Right to Information
Commercial speech did not always enjoy First Amendment protection.99 The
Supreme Court ordained in 1942 that the “Constitution imposed no such restraint
on government as respects purely to commercial advertising.”100 For many years,
courts deferred to states on economic regulations that affected speech. 101 That
changed when a Virginia newspaper published ads for legal abortion clinics in New
York, resulting in the publisher’s conviction under a state law criminalizing any
publication that encouraged or promoted abortion.102 Roe v. Wade had been decided
a few years earlier, and perhaps in furtherance of a woman’s right to choose, the
Court overturned the publisher’s conviction, holding that the First Amendment
protects commercial ads, particularly on matters of “clear” public interest.103
A year later, the Court struck down a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacists
from advertising drug prices, finding that the “free flow of commercial information
is indispensable” to the nation’s economy and “intelligent and well informed”
economic decision-making.104 The Court also found that even when advertising is
tasteless or excessive, it still informs consumers about who is “producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”105 The Court concluded
that “speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction” should

97

New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d at 130.
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S at 315 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
99
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
100
Id. at 54 (recalling the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to evade a city ordinance banning
commercial leaflets by double-siding his submarine tour fliers with a political ad criticizing the
city).
101
VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11072, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (2019).
102
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1976).
103
Id. at 822.
104
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
105
Id.
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not lose its First Amendment protection simply because it is paid for.106
However, the Court carved out exceptions for false or deceptive ads,107 finding
commercial speech was less vulnerable to regulation due to its profit motive.108 The
Court also recognized a reciprocal right to “receive information and ideas” in
advertising, which provided the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council with standing
to challenge the law.109
In subsequent years the Court observed a “common-sense” distinction between
speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which the government regulates,
and other varieties of speech.110 In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, the Court concluded that commercial speech
warranted “lesser protection” than other forms of expression due to its
informational value to consumers.111 The Court found that unless an advertisement
is misleading or related to illegal activity, the government need only show a
substantial interest that is directly advanced by the regulation, which must not be
more extensive than necessary.112
Nonetheless, the Court “stress[ed] the importance of free dissemination of
information about commercial choices in a market economy.”113 It invalidated
restrictions on truthful advertising by lawyers promoting legal services,114 and ruled
that a private utility has a First Amendment right to express its opinion on public
policy through advertising inserted into customers’ monthly billing statements.115
More recently, the Court has moved toward broader protection for commercial
speech.116 The Court unanimously struck down a Rhode Island ban on the
advertising of liquor prices aimed at keeping prices high so consumers would
purchase less alcohol, but the justices split on their reasoning.117 Justice Stevens,
writing for a plurality, reasoned that the Court should apply a rigorous First
Amendment analysis “when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a
fair bargaining process,” such as to achieve an underlying policy goal. 118 The
106
Id. at 761-62 (rejecting the state’s argument that without the law consumers would be
endangered by pharmacies offering lower prices and potentially lower-quality medications).
107
Id. at 771.
108
Id. at 771 n.24.
109
Id. at 757.
110
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
111
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(concluding commercial speech did not warrant strict scrutiny, which requires that any restrictions
on speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest).
112
Id. at 564-566 (applying test to invalidate state order that electric utilities stop promoting
the use of electricity, finding the state’s “rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing
information about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy
use”); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
113
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 521 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part).
114
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
115
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
116
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484 (1996) (striking down state law intended to encourage
temperance by making it harder to find who sells the cheapest alcohol).
117
Id. at 515.
118
Id. at 501.

14

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:1

plurality concluded that the state thus needed to show that its ban on price
advertising “significantly” advanced the state’s interest in reducing alcohol
consumption, which the Court found it failed to do.119
In a concurrence with the judgment but not with Stevens’ reasoning, Justice
Thomas argued the Central Hudson test was problematic where the Court seemed
to “accept the legitimacy of laws that suppress information in order to manipulate
the choices of consumers—so long as the government could show that the
manipulation was in fact successful.”120 He also found no “philosophical or
historical basis” for ascribing a “lower value” to commercial speech than political
speech, and that some “historical materials suggest to the contrary.”121
More than a decade later, the Court invalidated a Vermont law that regulated
access to pharmacy prescription data after concluding such data was commercial
speech because it was used by drug companies to market medications to doctors.122
When applying the heightened scrutiny test from Central Hudson, the Court found
the law failed to permissibly advance the state’s interests in reducing health care
costs and promoting public health.123
B. Blurred Lines: When Commercial Ads Blend with Politics
Bus ads that blend commercial speech with political or religious elements
present a conundrum for courts. New York Magazine’s bus ad aimed at Mayor
Giuliani, referenced in Part I (D), is an example because it promoted the magazine’s
logo while “just as clearly criticiz[ing] the most prominent member of the City’s
government on an issue relevant to his performance of office.”124 Whether such an
ad is political or commercial may determine a transit agency’s ability to regulate
it.125
The Supreme Court has decreed that “reference to a specific product does not
by itself render [the message] commercial speech.”126 Nor does the mere fact that
the speaker has an economic motivation.”127 The message must be assessed as a
whole to evaluate whether commercial elements are “inextricably intertwined” with
fully protected speech.128 Employment ads with no opinion on social issues, for
example, are “classic examples of commercial speech.”129 But ads that convey a
political message while soliciting financial contributions for a movement are not.130
119

Id. at 505, 516.
Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
121
Id.
122
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
123
Id.
124
New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d at 131 (describing the ad which
included magazine’s logo with text that read “[p]ossibly the only good thing in New York Rudy
hasn’t taken credit for”).
125
Id.
126
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
127
Id. at 67.
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Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (holding university had established a
limited public forum where commercial speech was not permitted).
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Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
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New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, (1964).
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If an ad merely “links a product to a current public debate,” that does not equate to
political speech.131 The same is true vice-versa, as the Court has said “free speech
would be endangered” “i[f] affixing the commercial label permits the suppression
of any speech that may lead to political or social ‘volatility.’”132
The Ninth Circuit has held that a city bus system has the right to prohibit
exterior ads “combining political and religious advertisements with a commercial
offer.”133 In Children of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, a religious organization sued
after an anti-abortion bus ad was rejected.134 The ad displayed the symbol of a fetus
surrounded by a rosary with the following language:
“Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you” – God
Jeremiah 1:5 …
CHOOSE LIFE!135
The city’s new policy only allowed “speech which proposes a commercial
transaction.”136 When city officials pointed out the ad did not sell anything,
Children of the Rosary added the following:
“To purchase this message as a bumper sticker for your vehicle!
Contact [phone number].”137
In a split decision,138 retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White found that if
Children of the Rosary were successful, “the reasoning of Lehman is hollow . . .
because any candidate for political office could convert his political advertisement
into a commercial advertisement by simply offering the message as a bumper
sticker.”139 The appeals court cited the Supreme Court’s determination that blended
speech must be evaluated as a whole,140 and found the city’s interests in protecting
transit revenue and staying neutral on political and religious issues to be especially

131

Id.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to
express that truthful commercial speech should warrant strict scrutiny).
133
Child. of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 1998).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 975 (describing the city’s previous policy which specified what was prohibited
instead of what was permitted and prohibited ads “support[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate, issue or
cause, or which advocates or opposes a religion, . . . or belief”).
137
Id. (stating that the ACLU sponsored its own ad which was rejected for the following
language: “[t]he ACLU Supports Free Speech for Everyone . . . [t]o purchase this bumper sticker
please call [phone number].”)
138
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1983) (recalling
that Justice White authored the Perry decision establishing modern public forum doctrine during his
tenure on the Supreme Court); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 299 (recalling
that Justice White was among the justices who joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Lehman).
139
Child. of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 1998) (arguing an
opposite ruling would undermine the government's ability to act as a proprietor and force it into
“an all-or-nothing choice”).
140
Id. at 982 (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474).
132

16

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:1

strong.141 The Court also found that since the city had “consistently restrict[ed]
political and religious advertising” similar to the transit system in Lehman, it had
established a limited public forum.142
The dissent, authored by Circuit Judge John Noonan, argued the city’s policy
was flawed because “commercial media advertising can be full of political or
religious content.”143 The dissent argued the city should abandon the “simplicity”
of a commercial-only policy and become more “specific as to the content of the
commercial messages [the city] will not accept.”144 Under the current policy, he
noted, a private utility could advertise its commercial services while the Sierra Club
would be denied an opportunity to run ads opposing the construction of new
dams.145
Two decades later, the Ninth Circuit was less deferential to the Spokane Transit
Authority (STA) when it ruled that STA unreasonably rejected an ad sponsored by
its own workers’ union.146 The Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1015 (ATU) had
accused the transit agency of viewpoint discrimination by unfairly prohibiting labor
unions from promoting their services and making public service announcements.147
STA, stung by bad publicity over prior religious and labor-related ads, had turned
down a request to run an ATU ad urging Uber and Lyft drivers to unionize.148
STA cited its “Commercial Advertising Policy,” which allowed only public
service announcements and commercial and promotional advertising.”149 The latter
defined as an ad that: “[P]romotes or solicits the sale, rental, distribution or
available of goods, services, food, entertainment, events, programs . . . products or
property for commercial purposes or more generally promotes an entity that
engages in such activity.”150 STA concluded the union ad fell under banned “public
issue” ads, which were defined as: “expressing or advocating an opinion, position,
or viewpoint on matters of public debate about economic, political, religious or
social issues.”151
The Ninth Circuit found STA’s rejection of the ad as “public issue” advertising
was not supported by the record.152 The court concluded the agency provided “no
written guidance on how to assess whether an ad might express or advocate” on a
public issue.153 The appeals court was troubled that STA’s chief executive was “the
141

Id. at 981.
Id. at 978.
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Id. at 985 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
144
Id.
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Id.
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See Amalgamated Transit Union Loc. 1015 v. Spokane Transit Auth., 929 F.3d 643 (9th
Cir. 2019).
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Id.
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Id. at 648 (stating that the STA received numerous complaints and negative media
coverage when it allowed a grocer’s union to run attack ads against two local grocery chains, as
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 655 (expressing skepticism as to whether “public issue” ban could survive a facial
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final arbitrator” and “her standard seem[ed] entirely driven by what she believe[ed]
would reflect badly on STA.”154 The court also found her justifications were
unreasonable because the record showed STA had accepted other union ads that
generated no public complaints.155 In addition, the court noted that ATU had for
years displayed union stickers on the inside of STA buses without incident.156
The court also determined STA’s policy allowing commercial and promotional
speech was broader than the policy in Children of the Rosary, which meant an
advertiser “need not strictly propose a commercial transaction” to qualify.157 The
court thus concluded ATU’s ad also could have met the definition because ATU
engages in interstate commerce and advances developments in labor and
commercial markets,158 even if it did not collect fees for its service.159
III.

VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION

Even in a limited public forum, the government’s ability to regulate speech has
its limits. Any content restrictions in a limited forum must be viewpoint neutral and
reasonable.160 Content refers to ideas or the subject matter expressed by the speaker,
and in some cases, the function or purpose of the speaker’s message.161 In a public
forum, content discrimination is presumably unconstitutional unless such laws are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.162 This applies even when a law
does not target content on its face, but the law was enacted with the content of
certain speech in mind.163 Laws that regulate time, place and manner of speech are
content-neutral.164
Viewpoint discrimination targets a “specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker.”165 It is thus an “egregious form of content
discrimination” that is forbidden in any situation because a free society is
threatened when the government controls the message.166 It also may not be
obvious.167 Even in a limited public forum, viewpoint discrimination “is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
limitations.”168
154
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The Supreme Court in recent years has broadly defined viewpoint
discrimination to protect more than just the right to pick a side – it also protects
“the right to create and present arguments for particular positions in particular ways,
as the speaker chooses.”169 The Supreme Court also has blurred the lines between
content and viewpoint discrimination, finding speech that offends represents a
viewpoint,170 and that certain content, such as religious speech, can also serve as
the basis for a worldview or life perspective.171 Some circuit courts still tend to
focus more narrowly on religion as content even when it may be reflective of
viewpoint.172
A. Speech That Offends Expresses a Viewpoint
When speech is censored because it may offend or disparage someone, courts
pay close attention to whether the censorship is really viewpoint discrimination.173
Take Paul Cohen as an example. His claim to fame was walking into a Los
Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket that read “Fuck the Draft” during the Vietnam
War.174 Authorities prosecuted him for “maliciously and willfully disturbing the
peace” because onlookers had to see the inscription on his back.175 The Supreme
Court overturned his conviction, ruling that his back-of-the-jacket profanity was
speech, not conduct, and did not amount to obscenity or fighting words.176
Furthermore, the Court ruled it certainly did not rise to the level of a crime because
“some unwilling listeners in a public building may have been briefly exposed.”177
Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing for the majority, described free
expression as “powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours”178
and “[t]hat the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense
not a sign of weakness but of strength.”179
Harlan reasoned that the Constitution protects not just words, but their “emotive
function, which practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message.”180 He cautioned that if the government is given authority to
criminalize words merely because they offend someone, it “might soon seize upon
169

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
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(2020)
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Id. § 8:25, Examples of public and nonpublic forums – University funding: the
Rosenberger case (2020).
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See Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 140 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (2020)
(Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., statement on denial of cert).
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See Matal, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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Id. at 17 (noting disagreement with state appeals court’s conclusion that “it was certainly
reasonably foreseeable that [Cohen’s] conduct might cause others to rise up to commit a violent
act”).
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Id. at 22.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 25.
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the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression
of unpopular views.”181
A half-century later, in Matal v. Tam, the lead singer of a rock band known as
“The Slants” sued the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) after it refused to
register a trademark for the band’s name.182 Simon Tam’s application was denied
under a federal trademark law prohibiting trademarks that may ‘disparage ... or
bring ... into contemp[t] or disrepute” certain persons or groups because it
discriminated against offensive speech.183 The trademark office cited the term’s
use as a racial slur for people of Asian descent.184 Tam countered that was his whole
point – as an Asian American musician, he was trying to “reclaim” the term and
“stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity.”185 Tam pointed to the band’s lyrics
and songs, which drew inspiration from “childhood slurs and mocking nursery
rhymes.” The band had produced albums with names such as “The Yellow
Album.”186
The Court sided unanimously with Tam, ruling the disparagement clause failed
to pass the test for viewpoint discrimination because it singled out a subset of
expression based on the government’s determination that such speech would offend
others.187 But the eight justices who heard the case split evenly between two
plurality opinions. A plurality led by Justice Samuel Alito ruled the disparagement
clause violated a “bedrock First Amendment principle that “[s]peech may not be
banned [because it] expresses ideas that offend.”188 Alito concluded it was
irrelevant whether the disparagement clause “evenhandedly prohibits
disparagement of all groups” because “[t]hat is viewpoint discrimination in the
sense relevant here: giving offense is a viewpoint.”189
In a separate plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that under the law, an
applicant may register a positive trademark but not a derogatory one, “reflect[ing]
the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive,” which is
the “essence of viewpoint discrimination.”190 Kennedy wrote that “[t]he
Government may not insulate a law from charges of viewpoint discrimination by
tying censorship to the reaction of the speaker’s audience,”191 and that the
government was attempting “to decide whether the relevant audience would find
181
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183
Id.
184
Id. at 1754.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1763 (declining to address whether trademarks are commercial speech, but reasoning
that even if they were, the disparagement clause would fail under Central Hudson because the
government was trying to squelch offensive speech”).
188
Id. See generally Clay Calvert, Merging Offensive-Speech Cases with Viewpoint
Discrimination Principles: The Immediate Impact of Matal v. Tam on Two Strands of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 829 (2019) (presenting an analysis as to
whether Matal reached the right conclusion while incorrectly conflating offensive name-calling
with viewpoint discrimination).
189
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
190
Id. at 1766.
191
Id.
182

20

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:1

the speech offensive.”192 Kennedy noted that while thoughtful persons might
disagree with Tam’s approach, “the dissonance between the trademark’s potential
to teach and the Government’s own insistence on its own, opposite and negative
interpretation confirms the constitutional vice of the statute.”193
B. Matal Cuts Both Ways on Discriminatory Bus Ads
Ironically, Matal became a weapon for the American Freedom Defense
Initiative to attack public transit agencies over similar policies intended to protect
underrepresented groups riding the bus from being “bombard[ed] with demeaning
messages.”194 The D.C. Circuit rejected AFDI’s argument outright, finding Matal
did not apply to transit systems because “Matal did not discuss forum doctrine in
any depth” and “dealt not with Government permitting speech on government
property but with government protection of speech and commercial
infringement.”195 Prior to Matal, the First Circuit had upheld a disparagement
clause adopted by Boston’s transit system while the Second Circuit ruled in favor
of AFDI by invalidating a ban on ads that demeaned on the basis of “race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, gender, age, disability or sexual orientation” on
buses in New York.196
The Sixth Circuit reconsidered a prior decision invalidating a ban on bus ads
that subjected people to “scorn or ridicule,”197 concluding that in light of Matal, the
policy “cannot survive this broader understanding of viewpoint discrimination”
because it operates “[l]ike the trademark statute prohibiting marks that bring
individuals into ‘disrepute.’”198
The Ninth Circuit held Matal applies “with full force” to a King County Metro
policy in Seattle banning ads that “demean[] or disparage[] an individual, group of
individuals or entity.”199 The appeals court struck down the policy, finding “[n]o
material textual difference distinguished Metro’s disparagement clause from the
trademark provision at issue in Matal,” and like the disparagement clause, King
County’s policy “require[d] the rejection of an ad solely because it offends.”200 At
issue in the Seattle case was a large AFDI-sponsored bus ad that displayed a gallery
of suspected terrorists and offered a $25 million reward for information leading to
192
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the capture of “These Jihadis.”201 The ad was recreated from a controversial bus ad
originally sponsored by the FBI and State Department that ran on King County’s
buses.202 Federal officials withdrew the original version in response to concerns it
was discriminatory and would incite hate crimes.203
The Ninth Circuit wrote “we cannot conclude that the appropriate limitation on
subject matter is ‘offensive speech’ any more than we could conclude that an
appropriate limitation on subject matter is ‘pro-life speech’ or ‘pro-choice speech’”
because that would “exclude speech solely on the basis of viewpoint – an
impermissible restriction in a nonpublic forum.”204 King County argued the policy
applied evenhandedly, and that it would have accepted the ad with minor
revisions,205 but AFDI insisted on presenting its message in a way that “caused
discomfort and unpleasantness.”206
C. Religious Perspectives Are Protected Viewpoints
The Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that religious speech cannot be
banned in a limited public forum if it represents a religious perspective on a topic
that is otherwise allowed for discussion.207 In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of University of Virginia, the Court concluded that religion serves not only as a
“vast area of inquiry,” but also as “a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint
from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”208 Therefore,
the Court found the university had had improperly denied student activity funds to
a Christian-oriented student magazine called “Wide Awake.”209
Members of the magazine’s staff sued after the Student Council refused to
reimburse them for printing costs, citing the University’s guidelines on religious
activities and final decision by the Dean of Students.210 School officials were also
concerned that subsidizing religious speech violated the separation of church and
state.211
The Court concluded the activity fund constituted a limited public forum in a
“metaphysical” sense, and thus was beholden to the same principle that viewpoint
discrimination occurs when school property is opened to discussion from all views
except those “dealing with the subject matter from a religious viewpoint.”212 The
Court ruled the University had not excluded all religious subject matter, but instead
201
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had targeted student publications with “religious editorial viewpoints” for
“disfavored treatment.”213 Here, students were allowed to write about topics such
as “racism, or stress, or pregnancy – but not if their faith informed the message.”214
Finally, the Court held that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which
bars the government from favoring one religion over the other, did not prohibit the
University from honoring its duties to free speech as long as the program was
neutral toward religion.215
In Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Court
found that a school district discriminated against a religious viewpoint when it
opened its facilities to after-hours public use but objected when a church group
sought to host a film series on family issues and child rearing.216 The Court found
that the “film series here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible . . .
and its exhibition was denied solely because the series dealt with the subject from
a religious standpoint.”217 The Court similarly ruled in Good News Club v. Milford
School District that a Christian children’s club could not be prevented from holding
meetings on school grounds solely because it sought to engage on the “teaching of
morals and character,” which was a topic that allowed for discussion in the
forum.218
D. Circuit Courts Split on Religious Bus Ads
Federal courts disagree on how this line of cases should apply to transit
agencies, particularly in light of Lehman.219 In Washington, D.C., the Washington
Area Metropolitan Transit Authority (WAMTA) banned religious ads on its system
in 2015, along with political and advocacy ads, after tracking “near-monthly
complaints” about increasingly offensive and controversial ad campaigns.220 Such
ads had alienated riders, increased costs due to vandalism, and raised concerns
about inciting violence or terrorism, according to a declaration from Lynn
Bowersox, an assistant general manager.221 An ad on WAMTA buses decrying the
Catholic Church’s stance on condoms, for instance, “generated hundreds of angry
phone calls and letters,” making it “the second-largest negative response to any
ad.”222
The breaking point came when the American Freedom Defense Initiative
sought to promote a bus ad campaign that caricatured the Prophet Muhammad,
similar to a contest the organization had sponsored in Texas that led to a shooting.223
213
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WAMTA’s executive board imposed an immediate moratorium on religious ads,
along with “issue-oriented” ads, political and advocacy ads,224 and later adopted the
ban permanently.225
The new policy was challenged in several lawsuits,226 including one that
required the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to determine
whether a religious-themed Christmas ad can be treated differently than a holiday
shopping ad from Macy’s.227
1. A Christmas Ad Controversy
WMATA, acting under the new “Guideline 12” which prohibited ads
“promot[ing] or oppos[ing] any religion, religious practice or belief,”228 had
refused to run an ad promoted by the Catholic Archdiocese of
Washington.229 Entitled “Find the Perfect Gift, the ad depicted a starry night and
three silhouetted shepherds.”230 It was intended “to share a simple message of
hope, welcoming all to Christmas Mass or in joining in public service to help the
most vulnerable in our community during the liturgical season of Advent.”231
The Archdiocese argued in its lawsuit that WAMTA would not have objected
if Amazon or Macy’s wanted to run ads “with the same text and graphics or with
reindeer instead of shepherds.”232 It accused WAMTA of suppressing religious
viewpoints on subjects “otherwise allow[ed] on bus exteriors, such as charitable
giving and Christmas.”233 WAMTA argued the ad also featured a website and social
media hashtag that led to “substantial content promoting the Catholic Church.”234
224
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Circuit Judge Judith Rogers, writing for a 2-1 majority, sided with WAMTA,
finding that the ad served as “an exhortation, repeatedly acknowledged by the
Archdiocese to be part of its evangelization effort to attend mass at Catholic
churches in connection with Advent.”235 The court found that had the ad
specifically focused on charitable donations, it likely would not have been denied,
as the transit agency had accepted ads from the Salvation Army with non-religious
content.236
The court also cited Lehman as “longstanding Supreme Court precedent” that a
transit system’s decision to accept only commercial advertising “does not rise to
the dignity of a First Amendment violation.”237 The court said that to find the
Archdiocese’s ads represented a perspective on Christmas would “eviscerate the
distinction between viewpoint-based and subject-based regulation” and the
“longstanding recognition that the government may limit a non-public forum to
commercial advertising.”238 The court found that if it were to accept that argument,
“governments might be required to accept speech on all subjects because
the Archdiocese offers no principled limit cabining its position to religion.”239
The court also reasoned that WAMTA’s buses were not intended for the same
“broad range” of social and civic activities as forums in Rosenberger and other
religion cases.240 Thus the ad represented religious content that could be restricted
and not a religious viewpoint that was impermissibly excluded on subjects such as
charitable giving and Christmastime.241 Furthermore, the court found that
WAMTA’s policy prevents discrimination because it “prohibits religious and antireligious ads in clear, broad categories” under which “bureaucrats are not called
upon to decide whether the ad criticizing the Catholic Church’s position on condom
usage, or the anti-Islam Muhammad ad, or the Find a Perfect Gift campaign ad is
the more ‘offensive,’ or otherwise censor religious messages.”242
2. Atheists Win One for Religious Speech
The Third Circuit criticized its Beltway counterpart in a separate decision
involving religious and atheistic bus ads, finding viewpoint discrimination is
“impermissible in any forum.”243 The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the
Northeastern Pennsylvania Freethought Society, which fought a decision by the bus
system in Scranton, Pennsylvania to ban a bus ad that would have said
“Atheists.”244
The County of Lackawanna Transit System, or “COLTS,” had for years run an
235
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array of ads, including ads from churches, Catholic schools, and even “evangelist
Beverly Benton and her Saturday night miracle service.”245 However, COLTS
denied the Freethought Society’s ad, which featured the organization’s web address
over a blue sky with clouds, while reconsidering its policies on religious speech.246
COLTS staff were concerned that the Freethought Society wanted to spark
religious debates that would turn violent.247 In a rejection letter, COLTS noted its
goal of “provid[ing] a safe and welcoming environment” and that ads “promot[ing]
debate over public issues such as abortion, gun control or the existence of God in a
confined space like the inside of a bus detracts from that goal.”248
COLTS initially had no formal advertising policy, but reserved the right to
reject “objectionable or controversial ads.”249 However, as controversies engulfed
other cities, transit officials grew increasingly concerned about religious ads in
particular.250 Gretchen Wintermantel, COLTS marketing director, wrote COLTS’s
first formal policy, which was based on her research into other controversies
“kindled by inflammatory ad campaigns.251 In 2013, COLTS revised the policy to
establish a limited public forum reserved ‘for the sole purpose of generating
revenue while maintaining or increasing its ridership.”252 The policy specifically
banned ads that:
[P]romote the existence or non-existence of a supreme deity, deities,
being or beings; that address, promote criticize or attack a religion
or religions, religious beliefs or lack of religious beliefs; that directly
quote or cite scriptures, religious text or texts involving religious
beliefs or lack of religious beliefs; or [that] are otherwise religious
in nature. 253
In a 2-1 ruling, the Third Circuit found that the advertising policy was
unconstitutional, rejecting a lower court decision that determined it was appropriate
to forbid religious and atheistic ads equally.254 Citing Rosenberger and other cases,
Circuit Judge Thomas Hardiman concluded the Freethought Society’s ad was more
akin to a marketing campaign to promote its “organizational existence, identity, and
outreach.”255 The court wrote “[n]othing in the record suggests COLTS’s policy
would prohibit secular associations from advertising their organizational
philosophy or from communicating the message: “We exist, this is who we are,
consider learning about or joining us.”256
The court noted COLTS’s stated concerns were undercut by the fact that the
agency had run other religious ads and some of its drivers occasionally plugged the
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words “God Bless America” in their overhead route displays.257 Freethought
member Justin Vacula saw one of the buses go by and proposed the Atheists ad as
a way to promote the separation of church and state and show atheists there were
others like them in the community.258
The court further determined it would be “difficult, if not impossible to exclude
religion as a subject matter in a forum open to topics susceptible to a religious
perspective.”259 Religion, the court said, can represent a subject and “a standpoint
from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”260 Hardiman
wrote “[w]hat matters . . . isn’t how religious a message is, but whether it
communicates a religious (or atheistic) viewpoint on a subject to which the forum
is otherwise open.”261 The majority further reasoned that to uphold the policy would
mean that even the Declaration of Independence would be verboten because it
referred to the rights of people “endowed by their Creator.”262
Circuit Judge Robert Cowen dissented, sharing the D.C. Circuit’s concerns that
there was a “critical difference between the prohibition of religious perspectives . . .
and the exclusion of religion itself as a subject,” and this case fell into the latter
category.263 He drew an analogy to political speech, which also “provides . . . a
specific premise” from which a variety of subjects may be discussed, and yet
restrictions on political speech in limited public forums have been upheld.264
3. The Supreme Court Stays Out . . . Again
The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the Archdiocese’s appeal but Justice
Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, lamented that “a reversal would be
warranted for reasons admirably explained” by the dissenting opinion on the D.C.
Circuit and majority opinion in Freethought.265 Gorsuch noted that “[b]ecause the
full Court is unable to hear the case, it makes a poor candidate for our review.”266
Gorsuch said WAMTA’s actions were “viewpoint discrimination by a
governmental entity” and reiterated that the Court had on “no fewer than three
occasions” rejected similar “no-religious-speech policies” because “religion is not
just a subject isolated to itself, but also a ‘specific premise, a perspective, a
standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”267
“That's not to say WAMTA lacks a choice,” Gorsuch wrote. “The Constitution
requires the government to respect religious speech, not to maximize advertising
257
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revenues . . . if WAMTA finds messages like the one here intolerable, it may close
its buses to all advertisements” or “it might restrict advertisement space to subjects
where religious viewpoints are less likely to arise without running afoul of our free
speech precedents.”268
E. Advertising Restrictions Must Be Reasonable
The Third Circuit also ruled COLTS had failed to show its policy on religious
ads was reasonable.269 Content restrictions in a limited public forum must be
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.270
“[C]ommon-sense” is “sufficient to uphold a regulation under reasonableness
review.”271
The court assessed the forum’s purpose by how it was defined in COLTS’s
policy, which stated advertising was sold for the “sole purpose of generating
revenue . . . while at the same time maintaining or increasing ridership.”272 The
court thus evaluated the reasonableness of COLTS’ policies in terms of ad revenue
and ridership, and found the agency had not justified its restrictions, particularly
regarding its concerns that religious or atheistic ads might lead to heated debates
that would result in physical violence directed at passengers or drivers.273
The court noted COLTS could point to “disruptions on other transit systems”
but “failed to cite a single debate caused by an ad on one of its buses” despite having
accepted religious and political ads in the past.274 Furthermore, the court observed
that “[w]hile threats, boycotts, and vandalism could threaten ridership, COLTS
stipulated its policy ‘was specifically to prevent debate inside of . . . buses . . . and
had nothing to do with the debate outside the buses.”275
The court also found COLTS’ process for screening ads was “scattershot” and
“raise[d] the specter of arbitrary censorship.”276 For instance, the agency was
inconsistent in deciding when to review an advertiser’s website and whether
information contained online was relevant.277 The court noted COLTS had
excluded one ad because the organization’s website “promoted drinking,” while it
268
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accepted another ad tied to a “racist and anti-Semitic blog” — which it didn’t
discover until “it was shown the bigoted website during this litigation.278 When
COLTS’s marketing director was asked how she belatedly learned that an ad urging
parents to immunize their children touched on a widely controversial topic, she
replied “[t]hrough ‘[f]riends with kids, and news media.”279
1. Vague Policies Encourage Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court has long cautioned that the “danger of censorship and
abridgement of [] precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials
have unbridled discretion over a forum’s use.”280 When the government limits
access to a forum based on standards that are too vague or non-existent, free speech
is endangered.281 Thus, the Court has said the law must give a “person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”282 As the Court
has more recently added, the government “must draw a reasonable line” and “be
able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from
what must stay out.”283
In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the Court confronted a Minnesota state
law that prohibited wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political
insignia” within a polling place.284 The law did not define the term “political,”
which Chief Justice John Roberts noted could broadly refer to anything “relating to
government, a government, or the conduct of governmental affairs.”285 The Court
said its concern was the law would empower temporary “election judges” with
broad authority to screen individuals at the entrance and issue civil penalties.286
Even though a polling place is a limited public forum, the Court found the law failed
even “this forgiving test.”287
Minnesota officials had construed “political” as “conveying a message about
the electoral choices at issue in [the] polling place.”288 A separate “Election Day
Policy,”289 listed examples of banned materials, such as “[i]ssue oriented material
designed to influence or impact voting” and “[m]aterial promoting a group with
recognizable political views (such as the Tea Party, MoveOn.org).290 But the Court
found it “raise[d] more questions than it answer[ed]” because “[a]ny number of
associations, educational institutions, businesses and religious organizations could
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have an opinion on an ‘issue[] confronting voters in a given election.”291 The Court
reasoned that a “rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain
a mental index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and part on the
ballot is not reasonable.”292
The Court acknowledged that “some degree of discretion…is necessary”, but
speech restrictions must be amenable to reasoned application and “guided by
objective, workable standards.”293 The Court noted that “[w]ithout them, an
election judge’s own politics may shape his views on what counts as ‘political.’”294
2. Advertising Standards Must Be Objective and Workable
The Third Circuit, citing Mansky, ruled that the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transit Authority’s (SEPTA) advertising standards were “incapable of reasoned
application.”295 SEPTA prohibited ads “political in nature” or that involve “matters
of public debate about economic, political, religious, historic or social issues.”296
The Philadelphia transit system was sued after it rejected promotional interior ads
for an investigative news report because the subject matter – discriminatory
mortgage lending – was a “matter of public debate and litigation.”297
SEPTA had retooled its advertising policy after an AFDI legal victory that
forced the agency to run anti-Islamic ads that drew negative publicity and prompted
bus operators to boycott vehicles displaying the ads.298 Transit officials hoped more
robust restrictions would prevent a similar situation from happening again.299 The
Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, which submitted a friend-ofthe-court brief in the lawsuit, argued SEPTA had gone too far: “[T]he very purpose
of the First Amendment is to encourage public discussion and debate about issues
of public importance” and “[s]tifling those discussions because of fear that some
transit riders may be unhappy with certain messages is not a ‘reasonable’ purpose
for restricting speech.”300
Mansky has trickled down to other cases. The D.C. Circuit remanded an AFDI
lawsuit after concluding Mansky raised questions as to whether WMATA’s
advertising guidelines were “so broad as to provide . . . no meaningful constraint
upon its exercise of the power to squelch.”301 Finding Mansky and Matal had
compelled it to “change course,” the Sixth Circuit overturned a ban on political bus
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ads sponsored by AFDI in the Detroit area.302 The court reasoned the policy
established by the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation
(SMART) was unreasonable for the same reason as the ban on political apparel at
polling places.303 The court found SMART offered no “sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out,”304 including no training
manuals explaining how the term should be defined.”305
IV.

The Captive Audience Exception to Free Speech

Free speech must sometimes be balanced against the rights of a captive
audience or “unwilling listener.”306 Justice Douglas argued bus riders are a captive
audience, which justified the City of Shaker Heights in banning political ads to
spare the comfort and solicitude of its commuters.307After all, transit agencies sell
advertising “to generate revenue, not to lose it.”308
However, courts are not always clear about how far that protection extends.
For instance, can bus riders be captive to advertising on both the interior and
exterior of the bus?309 The answer is critical because the Supreme Court has “long
connected” reasonableness of a forum’s restrictions with the intrusiveness of
expressive activity.310 More importantly, there is a danger in allowing the audience
“veto power” that could be used to squelch unorthodox or unpopular views.311
A. Origins
The captive audience doctrine springs from a court-recognized right to privacy,
or “right to be let alone,” which although not explicit in the Constitution, is
construed from “zones of privacy” emanating from the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments.312 To be captive is somewhat of a misnomer, however, because
“there is almost always something we can do to avoid exposure to whatever we find
offensive,” such as “shut our eyes and plug our ears.”313 The issue for courts to
consider is primarily whether the “unwilling listener” has been unreasonably
302

Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 978 F.3d at

502.
303

Id. at 495.
Id.
305
Id. (emphasizing its decision did not apply to political campaign speech, commercial
speech, or other standards for determining “if a given ad qualifies in ‘more lucid terms’”).
306
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85
(1991).
307
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 306-07 (Douglas, J. concurring in
judgment).
308
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 978 F.3d at
501.
309
See Child. of the Rosary v. City of Phoenix, 154 F.3d at 977. But see Ne. Pa. Freethought
Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d at 439.
310
Freethought, 938 F.3d at 439.
311
Strauss, supra note 306, at 104.
312
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965).
313
Strauss, supra note 306, at 89.
304

2022] RETHINKING LEHMAN AND SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

31

burdened in whatever measure she had to take to avoid the offensive message the
speaker is trying to convey.314 And secondly, whether avoiding the message was a
necessity in the first place.315
The Supreme Court has long recognized the unwilling listener’s right to privacy
inside the home, ruling in 1942 that the First Amendment did not protect using
“sound trucks” to broadcast propaganda outside people’s homes.316 The Court
noted the “unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a
pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it,” for “in his home . . . he is
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loudspeakers
except through the protection of the municipality.”317
A “patently offensive” radio broadcast also raised strong privacy concerns
because “material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home” and “broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read.”318 In F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Foundation, the Court held that the Federal Communications Commission had
narrow authority to sanction a radio station for playing a recording of comedian
George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue during the mid-afternoon when the
“broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out” and “prior warnings cannot
completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content.”319 The
Court noted that “[t]o say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault
is to run away after the first blow.”320 Ironically, the father who brought the
complaint was not in his home, but driving with his son in the car when Carlin’s
program began playing on the radio.321
In a lawsuit challenging online regulations during the Internet’s early days, the
Court distinguished the Web as less “invasive” than radio or television because it
usually requires an affirmative act to access offensive content.322 The Court
reasoned users seldom encountered online content “by accident” and that “[a]lmost
all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content.”323
Furthermore, software and other tools can be used “to block sexually explicit
programming from [] children . . . in much the same way that addressees have the
burden of either blocking or tossing away unwanted mail.”324
Protecting the sanctity of the home and the children inside heavily influenced
the Court, however, to find that “the right to communicate must stop at the mailbox”
for publishers of sexually provocative materials being distributed to households that
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didn’t order them.325 In that case, Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., the Court upheld
a federal law authorizing the Postmaster General to remove home addresses from
publishers’ mailing lists at the customer’s request, which prompted publishers,
distributors, and owners of mail order houses to challenge on First Amendment
grounds.326 But the same concerns did not weigh as significantly when the Court
sided with a public utility company in Consolidated Edison after the company sued
to insert unsolicited materials in customers’ monthly electric bills.327 The Court
found that customers who were offended “may escape exposure to objectionable
material simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to the wastebasket.”328
Similarly, the Court ruled that a federal ban on unsolicited contraceptive
advertisements was excessively sweeping because it “purg[ed] all mailboxes of
unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for adults” for a “marginal degree of
protection.”329 The Court said mail recipients may themselves request that the Post
Office block unwanted materials but “the government itself can[not] shut off the
flow” to protect people who might be offended.330
However, a town ordinance that prohibited picketing “before or about” any
individual’s residence was upheld in part because the “type of picketers banned . . .
generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude
upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.”331
B. ‘Substantial Privacy Interests’ Must be at Stake
Outside the home, Cohen emphasized “we are often ‘captives' . . . to
objectionable speech,’”332 but shutting off discourse solely to protect another’s
sensibilities would “empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of
personal predilections.”333 Justice Harlan concluded the government should not be
able to silence speech for the sake of protecting others unless “substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an intolerable manner.”334 Harlan reasoned that when
Paul Cohen entered the courthouse in his infamous “Fuck the Draft” jacket,
onlookers could not claim to be a captive audience because they “could effectively
325
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avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”335
Cohen placed the burden on unwilling listeners outside the home to turn away,
unlike in Pacifica, where the Court was concerned about exposing children inside
the home to offensive speech.336 Following Cohen, the Court overturned a ban on
nudity in drive-in movies, which were visible from streets passing the theater.337
As in Cohen, the Court concluded that a passer-by could readily avert his or her
eyes to avoid seeing on-screen nudity, thus the city could not justify banning
movies with naked content.338
The Supreme Court similarly declined to extend the captive audience exception
to the father of a servicemember killed in Iraq who sued the Westboro Baptist
Church after church members picketed outside his son’s funeral.339 The Court
found the father was not captive because church members had stayed on public
property and well away from the service, that the plaintiff could only see the tops
of the picketers' signs, and picketers had lawfully exercised their right to “address
matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full
compliance with the guidance of local officials.”340
C. A Captive Audience on the Bus?
Lehman holds that bus riders are captive to ads inside the bus but is unclear
regarding offensive ads displayed on the bus exterior. Justice Brennan argued that
even if bus riders were a captive audience, that could not justify the city’s refusal
to rent Lehman advertising space on bus exteriors, where people inside the bus can’t
see them.341 He also countered that since the ads were textual and not broadcast,
“an unwilling or unsuspecting rapid transit rider is [not] powerless to avoid
messages he deems unsettling.”342 But Douglas countered that in his view, “the
right of the commuters to be free from forced instructions on their privacy precludes
the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.”343
In Children of the Rosary, then-retired Justice White found that when read in
context, Douglas’s “concern about forcing messages on a captive audience applies
to observers on the street and commuters inside a bus.”344 White rejected an
argument that Lehman should be construed narrowly to the bus interior.345
335
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld King County Metro’s ban on false political ads
that appeared on the outside of the bus, ruling that the agency “has an interest in
preventing the dissemination of false information to a captive audience that it has
created by providing public transit services.346 The D.C. Circuit similarly rejected
an argument that “bus exteriors are ‘unlike the interiors with their distinct captive
audience problems addressed in [Lehman].’”347
However, the court in Freethought concluded that the plurality and concurring
opinions in Lehman both recognized the “degree of captivity and the resultant
intrusion of privacy is significantly greater for a passenger on a bus than for a
person on the street.”348 The Third Circuit majority reasoned that “[a] rider may see
the ad for a few moments as the bus approaches or while boarding, but is not
subjected to it while riding the bus,” thus “we do not think the “solicitude for a
(partially) captive audience can bear the weight of COLTS’s restrictions.”349
Douglas’s concurrence in Lehman quotes his dissent from a prior case involving
a government initiative in Washington, D.C., during the 1950s to play radio music
inside streetcars.350 Douglas feared radios would someday be used to spread
propaganda, writing “[s]o far as the right of privacy is concerned the purpose makes
no difference.”351 His dissent in the prior case indicates he was concerned about the
risk of constant exposure inside the transit vehicle.
As one scholar noted, “[p]erhaps the only clear conclusions one can draw is that
captive audience doctrine is more likely to be used to restrict speech when the
individual is viewed as ‘captive in the home’ than simply on the street, and
individuals are more likely to be viewed as captive when the speech is spoken,
rather than written.”352 Or again, as Justice Harlan concluded in Cohen, when
substantial privacy rights are invaded in an intolerable manner.353 But the lack of
consistency on what this means has prompted calls for clearer guidance. Otherwise,
“the danger is that it will be used to silence speech in circumstances that do not
justify restricting the First Amendment.”354
V.

The Supreme Court Must Revisit Lehman

Federal courts are divided primarily over three questions on bus advertising: (1)
whether ads with religious or offensive messages can be banned in a limited public
forum, particularly if commercial advertising is accepted; (2) whether accepting
political ads indicates a designated public forum that means restrictions are
346
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impermissible unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest;
and (3) whether a captive audience inside a transit vehicle justifies banning
controversial ads on the exterior of the vehicle.
The inconsistency on the first question stems in part from disagreement as to
what constitutes viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court could address this
by establishing that religious perspectives and offensive speech are protected
viewpoints in advertising on transit buses. All three issues could be addressed by
clarifying that Lehman should only apply to political ads on the interior of the bus
and not to ads that are visible on the exterior, which tracks with the language of the
Lehman opinion.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court must clarify what Lehman is: a plurality
opinion bound by Justice Douglas’s concurrence that says ads containing political
content may be banned inside the bus to protect captive riders. It says nothing more.
Lehman has often been interpreted more broadly which contributes to the split
among federal courts and encourages overly broad advertising restrictions that
produce legal headaches for transit agencies and advertisers alike.
To understand how Lehman could be fixed to resolve the constitutional issues
it raises, it is important to understand how it contributed to them. First, Lehman was
confusing from the start because it flipped “the traditional priorities of the First
Amendment” by allowing stronger protection for commercial speech than political
speech in a limited public forum. This contributed to the divide between courts as
to whether transit systems that accept political ads are a designated or limited public
forum.
Secondly, Lehman is not aging well. The Lehman opinion was written within
the context of content-based restrictions on political ads. The Supreme Court has
since recognized that some content can also reflect a protected viewpoint, which is
a much broader understanding of viewpoint discrimination and what constitutes
protected speech.355 Some lower courts still tend to apply a Lehman lens when they
should be looking through the prism of Rosenberger, Matal, and Mansky.
Finally, Lehman has been broadly construed to apply to both the interior and
exterior of transit vehicles when the interior and exterior should be analyzed as two
distinct forums.356 The Supreme Court should clarify that Lehman applies only to
the interior of the bus, which would accord with the actual language of the opinion.
It also would serve to cabin Lehman to an area of the bus that is not frequently the
subject of litigation and where the captive audience’s rights provide a sound
constitutional basis for restricting offensive speech. This would encourage courts
and transit agencies to focus less on increasingly difficult distinctions between
political, commercial and religious speech, and more on the reasonableness of the
justifications for restricting ads that appear on the exterior.
A. Lehman Invites Viewpoint Discrimination
Clarifying that Lehman does not govern advertising on the outside of a bus
would help wipe away confusion about whether transit advertising restrictions are
355
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content—or viewpoint—based.
This tension was reflected in the Archdiocese case. The D.C. Circuit concluded
the Archdiocese’s Christmas ad did not represent a protected religious viewpoint in
part because doing so would conflict with Lehman.357 But Lehman dealt with
restrictions on ads with political content. Had the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
Archdiocese’s appeal, it likely would have overturned the D.C. Circuit’s decision
because it conflicts with Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel, Good News Club, and
Matal.358 Perhaps if Lehman had not been a factor with exterior bus ads, the
appellate court may have been more inclined to conclude as the Third Circuit did
regarding the atheistic ad in Freethought, as in Matal, where the Supreme Court
said viewpoint discrimination should be interpreted in a “broad sense.”359 The
current makeup of the Court reinforces this author’s estimation that it would
construe viewpoint discrimination broadly in a transit advertising case.360
The D.C. Circuit’s determination that a public transit bus is a narrower forum
than a university or school facility also does not necessarily pan out. A public transit
bus is arguably more visible and accessible to the general public than a school
newspaper or school meeting room. While a bus or subway car is proprietary and
carries people to places, that does not exempt the government from the
requirements of viewpoint neutrality, and in fact, it counsels in favor of greater
caution when restricting speech due to its visibility to the traveling public.
Some argue that blurring the distinction between content and viewpoint
discrimination “make[s] it virtually impossible for government bodies to administer
[limited] public forums.”361 But as Justice Gorsuch and others have pointed out “the
government may minimize religious speech incidentally by limiting a forum . . . to
subjects where religious views are unlikely or rare.”362
B. Lehman’s Broad Restrictions Are No Longer Valid
Lehman’s condoning of broad categorical restrictions is no longer
constitutionally valid without objective and workable standards. A policy
prohibiting ads that are “political in nature” or that involve “matters of public
debate” is too broad to be objective and workable. Interestingly, the City of Shaker
Heights advertising policy at issue in Lehman likely would not survive a facial
challenge today because it lacked objective and workable criteria for defining
357
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“political.”363
Justice Brennan warned in Lehman that “the line between ideological and
nonideological speech is impossible to draw with accuracy.”364 The line is even
fuzzier between commercial and non-commercial speech. The former is not easily
boiled down to “speech that proposes a commercial transaction,”365 particularly
when brands are often selling an image and affiliating their products with social
issues.366 Nike, for example, sponsored NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick in an
ad campaign to protest racial discrimination.367 After the police killing of George
Floyd in Minneapolis, many companies ran ads calling for racial justice amidst
widespread protests in support of the Black Lives Matter movement.368 They
included the NBA (“The Truth is #BlackLivesMatter”), McDonalds (“One of Us”
ad) and Coca-Cola (“The Change”).369 Would ads similar to these be banned under
a commercial-only policy because they contain social or political messaging? The
answer likely depends on who decides.370
This is what the appeals court found troublesome in Freethought,371 and what
the Supreme Court addressed in Mansky. Vague and overly broad policies open the
door to viewpoint discrimination, even if incidentally. Officials who enforce vague
restrictions have too much discretion in discerning between commercial and
political speech, and in navigating the blurred distinctions between content and
viewpoint. It doesn’t matter whether it’s the head of a transit agency or a private
vendor hired to screen advertisements. Justice Roberts noted the risk is that one’s
bias will shape his or her views as to what is “political.”372 This is all the while
dealing with savvy advocacy groups who will not hesitate to use censorship as a
rallying cry to their cause.
As the ACLU put it, sometimes when the government acts to avoid offensive
and hateful speech, it eliminates “speech that makes us think.”373 Transit authorities
363
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and their advertising vendors may have the best intentions and still censor
information at the core of what the First Amendment was designed to protect. The
rejected news ads in Philadelphia buses are a case in point.374 These ads promoted
journalism designed to inform the public about racial discrimination in mortgage
lending — a topic of critical importance. The appellate court questioned how such
news ads could fall into the prohibited “matters of debate” when SEPTA had
accepted ads from financial institutions promoting their lending service, as well as
ads from Facebook and the Democratic National Convention.375
Justice Brennan similarly asked in Lehman whether banning one form of
speech and not the other was supported by the reasons offered by the government.
In Freethought, the Third Circuit found the record did not support COLTS’s
concerns that religious bus ads would affect transit service. 376 The Ninth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in the Spokane Transit Authority case where union
ads were rejected.377
These cases illustrate why it’s arguably more important to focus on whether
advertising restrictions are reasonably drawn than whether an ad is political or
commercial. The lines are often so close between political and commercial speech,
and, as these cases show, even good intentions can end up on the wrong side of the
First Amendment.
C. Lehman’s Scope Can Be Limited Without Overturning It
A ruling that narrows Lehman’s scope to the interior of transit vehicles limits
some of its flaws to an area of the vehicle where protecting the captive audience is
a sound justification. A ruling in this direction would fit the actual language of the
plurality opinion.
The plurality in Lehman never directly addresses exterior bus ads. Blackmun
wrote “a city transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable
choices . . . in its vehicles.”378 Brennan specifically challenged the City’s argument
that “advertising in its transit cars is incompatible with the rapid transit system's
primary function of providing transportation.”379 Brennan’s dissent is where we
learn Harry Lehman wanted to buy ads on both the interior and exterior, to which
Brennan argues the captive audience should have no bearing on either.
The only other time the justices refer to exterior ads is when both Blackmun
and Douglas quote Justice Louis Brandeis’ opinion in Packer Corp. v. Utah
upholding a ban on cigarette advertisements on billboards and streetcars in the
1930s.380 But the passage they cite is not specific enough to indicate one way or the
other.
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One may argue that transit riders are a captive audience when exposed to
exterior advertisements as they board the bus, particularly with messages that are
so insidious that they are felt even once out of sight. This is especially pertinent
when ads disparage based on race, gender, sexual identity or gender. However, the
Court has applied captive audience doctrine “only sparingly”381 to shield listeners
from protected speech such as when substantial privacy interests are at stake.382
Generally, that means inside the home or where the unwilling viewer is unable to
“avert their eyes.”383 On a bus or transit vehicle, that means inside the passenger
area.
This is further supported by the Court’s decision in Snyder regarding the
Westboro Baptist Church.384 If a grieving father is not captive to protestors outside
his son’s funeral,385 it is difficult to fathom the Court seeing a boarding passenger
or passerby as captive. People outside the bus are likely analogous to the observers
of Paul Cohen’s jacket—they can avert their eyes.
D. The Court Should Adopt a Test to Measure the Communicative Value of
Government Property
The Court may take the next opportunity to re-assess whether the exterior of a
transit vehicle should be a designated or limited forum. The author proposes that
this would also present an opportunity to adopt a test specifically for assessing the
forum’s communicative value. This test would ask two questions: (1) whether the
property sought by the speaker is regularly visible from, or an extension of, a
traditional public forum such as a street, park, or civic plaza; 386 and (2) whether
closing or limiting an open forum would substantially burden the public’s right to
receive information or ideas.387 A hit on either prong would indicate the
government could not have reasonably intended to operate a limited public forum
because it has high communicative value. This would be one factor to consider in
determining the nature and purpose of the forum.
Assessing communicative value would be especially helpful in situations as in
some of the transit advertising cases where the government switched from a
designated to limited forum. Some argue that the government has an unchecked
ability to impose stricter regulations “by doing nothing more than articulating a
non-speech-related purpose for the area.”388 This potentially allows safe harbor to
“open and shut a forum, willy-nilly” when the government is trying to keep out
381
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undesired speakers or appease hecklers who want to cancel speech with which they
disagree.389
Justice Kennedy once critiqued the Court’s approach to public forum analysis
as too deferential to the government’s own “defined purpose for the property”
rather than the “actual, physical characteristics and uses.”390 By adopting a test for
communicative value, the Court could better assess the “objective characteristics
of government property and its customary use by the public.”391 A high
communicative value would not necessarily require the government to open a
forum to speech, but it would help determine whether an operative forum was
intended to be opened to speech.
The second prong of the proposed test – whether closing the forum substantially
burdens a right to receive information — could be measured by objective factors
such as audience size, accessibility, and whether it provides a low-cost or
convenient source of public information. If the forum is not readily visible or not
regularly visited by the public, that would support finding that the forum is limited.
Applying this analysis to bus exteriors arguably would indicate a designated forum
because buses “call attention to themselves” and “unlike billboards, they move
down central streets.”392 Furthermore, public transit systems are “one of the few
government-owned spaces where many persons have extensive contact with other
members of the public.”393
Critics might argue that such a test would raise the bar for the government to
regulate its own property. Justice Blackmun expressed concern in Lehman that
limiting the government’s ability to control its property would open public facilities
“to every would-be pamphleteer and politician.”394 It’s important to note, however,
that the government would retain authority to impose time, place, and manner
restrictions.395 Furthermore, Blackmun later wrote that “[a]ccess to government
property can be crucially important to those who wish to exercise their First
Amendment rights” because it “often provides the only space suitable for large
gatherings, and it is a less-costly means of communication so “essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people.”396
A test for communicative value could also help courts better assess any future
disputes involving access to government websites and social media, which have
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become gathering places for the exchange of views and public information.397
VI.

STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC TRANSIT AGENCIES

None of this is to say transit authorities are unreasonable in trying to avoid
becoming platforms for polarizing speech. Advertising provides a valuable revenue
source for public transportation, which is a vital public service, and technology is
creating more opportunities to capitalize on transit systems’ potential as a display
space.398 Yet, even under the more favorable rules of a limited public forum, the
Supreme Court’s decisions on viewpoint discrimination and offensive speech
significantly limit the ability of transit authorities to restrict controversial ads.399
Perhaps the best strategy is the all-or-nothing choice: Either accept all
advertising and the potential consequences, or stay out of the advertising business
altogether and avoid offending customers and fighting organizations like AFDI in
court.400 The latter option escapes the difficulty of navigating what some call the
First Amendment “paradox.”401 This is the notion that while the First Amendment
protects civic discussion and exchange of ideas, it has to let in speech that is
sometimes destructive to reasonable discourse.402 Matal is example: The Court’s
decision enabled Simon Tam to further his efforts to diminish the power of a racial
slur but also opened the door to hate ads on city buses because it was used to
invalidate bans on disparaging speech.403 This paradox and the First Amendment’s
equal protection for various points and counterpoints makes it’s difficult to single
out unacceptable political and religious speech, even in a limited public forum.
Transit agencies can also close their forums to everything but “government
speech” such as public service ads and internal agency promotions.404 For transit
authorities that want to continue selling advertising, however, there are additional
tools besides censorship, including the use of counterspeech, that can be effective
at tempering offensive ads while upholding the First Amendment tradition of “more
speech, not less.”405 They are discussed more in-depth below.
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A. Restrictions on Extremely Disruptive Ads
The government “need not wait until havoc is wreaked” when there are genuine
threats of disruption to the forum.406 To that end, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
“disruption clause” in King County Metro’s policy barring any ad “so
objectionable” under “prevailing community standards” as to be reasonably
foreseeable the ad “may result in harm to, disruption of, or interference with the
transportation system.”407
In that case, Seattle television stations had learned of a planned bus ad urging
an end to U.S. support for Israel.408 Angry callers flooded the agency’s phone
lines,409 and someone left “[p]hotographs depicting dead or injured bus passengers
and damaged buses,” along with threatening messages at the agency’s Customer
Service Center.410 AFDI and other groups proposed response ads, and as the uproar
grew, King County ultimately canceled its decision after consulting with law
enforcement and the U.S. Attorney’s Office about terrorism risks.411
The Ninth Circuit concluded King County’s disruption clause was reasonably
drawn to provide safe and reliable transportation.412 The court noted the policy was
similar to standards adopted by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, a landmark case regarding disruptive
speech in school settings.413 Further, the court found that threats posed were
“reasonably foreseeable” and not speculative, particularly in terms of potential
vandalism and violence; reduced ridership; and diversion of resources from Metro's
daily operations.414
The Ninth Circuit, however, subsequently ruled in another case involving the
same policy that King County had unreasonably censored an AFDI ad entitled
“Faces of Global Terrorism” over concerns the ad would provoke hate crimes and
disrupt transit service.415 King County had consulted an expert who described the
“invidious” nature of the ad, which depicted “only persons of a certain race or
ethnicity as terrorists,” and concluded it “may upset riders which, in turn, may cause
a decrease in ridership.”416 The court noted an “unusual opportunity to test Metro’s
hypothesis”417 since AFDI had essentially copied another version of the ad that had
run briefly on behalf of the FBI and State Department and King County “did not
experience any harm, disruption, or interference.”418 Ultimately, the two Ninth
406
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Circuit rulings give a sense of how concrete and severe a threat must be for
restrictions to be upheld.
B. Avoid Broad Content Restrictions
Broad and vague categorical restrictions should be avoided, such as bans on
“political” ads or ads relating to “matters of public debate.”419 Agencies operating
a limited public forum that want to keep out controversial topics should
specifically identify them, such as abortion or terrorism.420 A better approach to
avoiding political campaign speech would be to restrict ads that “promote or
oppose” an election, candidate, or campaign.421 Religion also can be tricky as a
topic but restrictions on ads regarding the “existence of a supreme being” may
fare better than barring ads on religion.
C. Counterspeech
Counterspeech can take the form of government-sponsored ads that confront
privately sponsored speech that is contrary to community views. It can serve to
expose offensive or discriminatory messages and allow agencies to share their
values. As Justice Brandeis noted in Whitney v. California: “[the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”422
San Francisco’s Municipal Transportation Agency (Muni) used counterspeech
when AFDI purchased bus ads that read: “In any war between civil man and the
savage, support the civilized man. Defeat Jihad. Support Israel.”423 Muni publicly
announced its counterspeech ads and that proceeds would be donated to the San
Francisco Human Rights Commission.424 The ads that went along with AFDI’s ads
included the following statement:
The city of Saint Francis has a long history of tolerance for all, and
while we honor a person’s right to self-expression, there are times
when we must say ‘enough.’ The recent ad has no value in
facilitating constructive dialogue or advancing the cause of peace
and justice. While this ad is protected under the First Amendment,
our ad policy, and our contractual obligations, we condemn the use
of any language that belittles, demeans or disparages others.425
Engy Abdelkader, a scholar who researched responses to AFDI’s campaign,
observed that in cities where AFDI’s ads were allowed to run, the ads prompted an
organized response from American Muslim communities and other faiths, which
419
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included a Twitter campaign with the hashtag “#MySubwayAd.”426 Organizations
“spoke out against the advertisements but nonetheless supported the First
Amendment right for the ads to run.”427 Had the ads not run, the community would
not have been informed of “the values of those responsible for the display.”428
Abdelkader wrote:
[I]n Detroit, where the government successfully suppressed the hate
advertisements, such a consensus did not materialize. In addition to
depriving the community of a potential opportunity to learn how to
respond appropriately to hateful messages, suppression of the
objectionable speech also redirects attention from the bigotry to a
controversy regarding prior restraints on speech, potentially
transforming a hate speech perpetrator like Geller into a victim of
censorship.429
As Abdelkader references, transit systems that ban controversial ads sometimes
generate negative publicity by doing so. Abdelkader also noted that counterspeech
may not be effective in places where bigotry and racism are tolerated.430
D. Disclaimers
New York City’s transit system adopted disclaimers with all “viewpoint ads,”
or political, religious or moral advertisements controversial in nature, following its
legal dispute with AFDI.431 The disclaimers included the following language: “This
is a paid advertisement sponsored by [Sponsor]. The display of this advertisement
does not imply MTA’s endorsement of any views expressed.”432 However,
disclaimers can have limited effectiveness in distancing transit officials from
offensive speech, as the Spokane Transit Authority noted in a presentation to its
governing board.433
E. Congressional Action
Congress could intervene by adding conditions to federal transit grants. This
may not be the ideal scenario for transit systems that want to retain control over
their advertising programs. But Congress may be interested in how local
governments regulate transit systems, “as the United States invests more than $12
billion annually through the Federal Transit Administration to support public transit
426
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systems.”434 As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Congress could, within
the confines of the First Amendment, choose to make federal funds that are
appropriated to local public transit systems contingent on implementing policies in
line with Congress’s views on religious speech.”435
CONCLUSION
Public transit systems provide a valuable advertising forum but face increasing
litigation over their restrictive policies. Transit authorities often cite Lehman as
justification for banning controversial ads to protect riders and revenue, but Lehman
is outdated in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions on offensive speech
and viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court must revisit Lehman and limit
its scope to the interior of transit vehicles, as this would help bring consistency to
transit advertising cases and encourage advertising policies that are viewpointneutral and reasonable. Public transit systems that continue to accept advertising
should consider other strategies beyond censorship, such as counterspeech and
disclaimers to emphasize their agency values. These strategies would allow transit
agencies to strike back at offensive ads while contributing to the marketplace of
ideas.
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